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SYMPOSIUM: GIVING KOREMATSU V. UNITED
STATES A SOBER SECOND THOUGHT
Arkansas Law Review Editorial Board
INTRODUCTION
We are elated to present Professor Mark Killenbeck’s
thought provoking article, Sober Second Thought? Korematsu
Reconsidered. Killenbeck dives into the Korematsu opinion and
its history with great care to determine whether it truly “has no
place in law under the Constitution” as Chief Justice John Roberts
declared in Trump v. Hawaii.1 While Korematsu’s result provides
an understandable “impulse to condemn” it, Killenbeck shows us
that focusing solely on the case’s result “stands apart from and in
stark contrast to its most important place in the constitutional order: articulation of precepts and terminology that provide the
foundations for strict scrutiny.”2
Killenbeck also shows us that the result-oriented viewpoint
which has led many to consider Korematsu and Trump “as two
peas in the same pod does not do justice to either.”3 The seemingly obvious parallels between the two cases are in fact superficial.4 While the “record is quite clear regarding Korematsu and
the Japanese . . . we simply do not have the facts necessary to
reach similar conclusions about Trump.”5
Killenbeck’s article is “intentionally provocative,” and he
acknowledges there will be many who will disagree with the argument he puts forward in the pages that follow.6 Killenbeck
welcomes the challenge and has invited several of the most

138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
2 Mark R. Killenbeck, Sober Second Thought? Korematsu Reconsidered, 74 ARK. L. REV.
152, 156 (2021).
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 157.
6 Id. at 235.
1
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prominent constitutional scholars in the legal academy to offer
their thoughts, endorsements, and critiques of his work.
Professor Jack M. Balkin distills Killenbeck’s argument
down to two points—and takes issue with each.7 First, Balkin criticizes the notion that the quality of the Supreme Court’s decisionmaking process “should be central to the honor and dishonor we
bestow on Supreme Court decisions.”8 To Balkin, the impact of
a decision is more important because the “canon (and the anticanon) are constructed by cultural memory, and cultural memory
is largely agnostic, if not ignorant, of” the Court’s underlying decision-making process.9
Second, Balkin is skeptical that Korematsu deserves “any
credit—much less respect—as the font of the strict scrutiny doctrine.”10 Where Korematsu paid mere lip service to strictly scrutinizing racial classifications, later Courts took Korematsu’s
“sanctimonious pronouncements” and gave them value by striking down racially discriminatory laws and practices.11 For Balkin, it is these cases, such as Oyama v. California, that deserve
canonical status—not Korematsu.12
Professor Sanford Levinson implores you to read “Mark
Killenbeck’s truly superb essay . . . with the utmost care.”13 Levinson’s response illustrates the value of Killenbeck’s work by diving into the lessons—good and bad—that Korematsu teaches us.
The good side of Korematsu is found in its role as an “origin
story” of strict scrutiny.14 Levinson praises Killenbeck’s “treatment of Korematsu” for offering “a splendid introduction” to the
Equal Protection Clause’s journey from “the ‘last resort’ of desperate lawyers” to “one of the linchpins of American constitutional argument.”15

Jack M. Balkin, Korematsu as the Tribute that Vice Pays to Virtue, 74 ARK. L. REV. 255
(2021).
8 Id. at 258.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 260.
11 Id. at 263.
12 Balkin, supra note 7, at 263.
13 Sanford Levinson, Korematsu, Hawaii, and Pedagogy, 74 ARK. L. REV. 269 (2021).
14 Id. at 277.
15 Id.
7
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The bad side of Korematsu is exemplified by the case’s holding and “the legal process that produced it.”16 Levinson describes
Killenbeck’s “portrayal of the lawyers who defended Order 9066
in front of the Supreme Court” as “devastating.”17 This devastating portrayal is not only valuable in explaining the outcome of
Korematsu. It is also “important that students know all of this in
order to understand that the law does not always ‘work itself
pure,’ that the process itself can be gravely defective, with attendant costs both to the fabric of the law and, more importantly,
to the victims of given decisions.”18
Professor Darrell A.H. Miller reflects on the nature of
“tainted precedent” within our judicial system.19 These precedents offer “reasonable, even valuable” legal principles but are
“buried deep within problematic or even odious opinions.”20
Sometimes the taint is a result of the author,21 other times because
the Court’s justifications for its decision are discredited,22 and
other times precedent is tainted because the valuable legal principle is not applied “to the ends of justice or is mired in problematic
or offensive reasoning on other issues.”23 Then there are cases
which are “so tainted that their citation for any proposition other
than condemnation is typically considered intolerable.”24 Korematsu is one such “anticanonical” case.25
Miller praises Killenbeck’s treatment of the tainted precedent dilemma presented by Korematsu. Miller acknowledges that
Korematsu is “contaminated with racism” but that shameful history “is not sufficient to sap it of its utility.”26 Burying Korematsu’s valuable legal proposition solely because it “comes out
of a racist past” is to follow a rule that “would leave us with precious little of the public good left.”27 Instead, Miller implores us
to be “circumspect” and “vigilant” about how the law is made,
Id. at 276.
Id. at 282.
18 Id. at 277.
19 Darrell A.H. Miller, Tainted Precedent, 74 ARK. L. REV. 291 (2021).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 292.
22 Id. at 293.
23 Id.
24 Miller, supra note 19, at 294.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 295.
27 Id.
16
17
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applied, and enforced.28 In this regard, Miller sees Killenbeck’s
article “as providing a valuable service.”29
Professor Eric L. Muller advises us not to mistake the
Court’s opinion in Korematsu “for an exhaustive account of the
relevant history.”30 By broadening the scope of consideration,
one is able to appreciate the historical importance of people and
events not covered in the Court’s opinion.31 Muller illustrates this
“Korematsu myopia” by noting the history of this very journal.32
Robert A. Leflar—Dean of the University of Arkansas School of
Law when the Arkansas Law Review was founded—served as Regional Attorney and Assistant Solicitor in the War Relocation Authority from 1942 to 1944.33
Muller remedies this common myopic view of Korematsu by
diving into the historical record leading up to the enactment of
Order 9066, concluding that despite the order’s neutral language
there was an invidious purpose embedded within it.34 This is in
stark contrast to Killenbeck’s argument that Order 9066 itself was
neutral but that invidious purpose and disparate impact arose due
to “a racially motivated enforcer.”35 To Muller, Korematsu myopia has led to Killenbeck grounding his argument “in an error of
historical fact.”36 Thus, Korematsu and Trump’s factual foundations “are not the reverse of each other, but the same.”37
Professor Robert L. Tsai appreciates Killenbeck’s “thoughtful and contrarian paper,” but remains unsold that Korematsu deserves saving.38 Tsai does agree with Killenbeck that Korematsu
has pedagogical value as “an object lesson in bad faith.”39 He disagrees, however, that Korematsu should be seen as a foundation
of strict scrutiny and questions the value of the strict scrutiny

Id.
Miller, supra note 19, at 296.
30 Eric L. Muller, There Was Nothing “Neutral” About Executive Order 9066, 74 ARK. L.
REV. 297 (2021).
31 Id.
32 Id. at 298.
33 Id. at 298, n.9.
34 Id. at 301-03.
35 Muller, supra note 30, at 300.
36 Id. at 301.
37 Id. at 304.
38 Robert L. Tsai, A Proper Burial, 74 ARK. L. REV. 307, 307 (2021).
39 Id. at 308.
28
29
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doctrine in general.40 Tsai, much like Balkin, believes that anything valuable lurking within Korematsu “can be found in less
tainted form elsewhere.”41 Moreover, Tsai argues that reflexive
use of strict scrutiny “could even be counterproductive, by promoting an unthinking refusal to grapple with the serious stakes of
a constitutional dispute.”42 Thus, Korematsu simply doesn’t offer
anything worth saving.
Tsai likens Killenbeck’s discussion of Trump v. Hawaii to
“damage control.”43 While Tsai agrees “that the ruling on the
merits is defensible,”44 he asks us to consider what “might start to
approach the ideal [and] on that score, Trump v. Hawaii falls woefully short.”45 Instead, considering Korematsu and Trump together shows that “a president’s ability to inflict mass suffering
has grown exponentially,”46 while “making it easier for government officials to disregard their obligations.”47
Professor Mark Tushnet takes Killenbeck’s article as a
chance to consider the saying that we are “a government of laws,
not a government of men and women.”48 This view, however,
ignores that “men and women appear at the stages of enactment,
application, and adjudication.”49 According to Tushnet, the saying should really go “a government of laws but also a government
of men and women.”50
Korematsu and Trump provide Tushnet an opportunity to examine the human element’s role in our legal system. While both
cases involved a facially neutral executive order, both involved
people with racially discriminatory motivations at the enactment
and application stages.51 Tushnet goes on to show that at the interpretation stage of both cases, the Supreme Court possibly established “that intentional racial discrimination at one part of the
Id.
Id.
42 Id. at 309.
43 Tsai, supra note 38, at 312.
44 Id. at 313.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 317.
47 Id. at 322.
48 Mark Tushnet, A Government of Law that is a Government of Men and Women, 74 ARK.
L. REV. 323, 323 (2021)
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 See generally id.
40
41
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enactment process can be cleansed by actions at another part.”52
While this approach may vindicate “the idea we have a government of laws” by “cleansing” individual government actors’ personal racism from our laws, it still “allows critics to continue to
fairly describe the policies as objectively systemically racist.”53
On behalf of the Arkansas Law Review, we would like to
express our sincerest gratitude to each of the incredible scholars
who so generously contributed to this series. Specifically, we
would like to thank Professor Mark R. Killenbeck for publishing
his insightful article in our journal and for bringing together this
prestigious group of commentators. By doing so, Professor
Killenbeck has made yet another significant contribution to both
the legal discourse and the Arkansas Law Review.54

Id. at 327.
Tushnet, supra note 48, at 328.
54 In 2019, our journal published a series debating McCulloch v. Maryland—a series made
possible by Professor Killenbeck and appropriately dubbed a “scholarly birthday party for
McColloch” by David S. Schwartz. See 72 ARK. L. REV. 1, 1-163 (2019). Last year, Professor Killenbeck assembled a similarly prestigious group of scholars to discuss Schwartz’s
book, The Spirit of the Constitution: John Marshall and the 200-Year Odyssey of McCulloch v. Maryland. See 73 ARK. L. REV. 69, 69-133 (2020).
52
53

